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ARTICLES
A LIGHT UNSEEN: THE HISTORY OF
CATHOLIC LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A RESPONSE TO OUR
COLLEAGUES AND CRITICS
JOHN M. BREEN & LEE J. STRANG†
INTRODUCTION
We are enormously grateful to the Journal of Catholic Legal
Studies for hosting the conference on February 14, 2020,
dedicated to a review of our book manuscript, A Light Unseen:
The History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States, and
for publishing the papers of the conference participants.1 We are
also grateful for the opportunity to offer some reply in the pages
of the Journal. A Light Unseen sets forth a comprehensive
history of the book’s subject matter. The book describes the
purposes for which Catholic law schools were founded, the
schools maturation and success in achieving accreditation and
some measure of respectability,2 and their search for meaning
since the 1960s-1970s when the prior unreflective cultural
Catholicism of these schools dissipated and in some cases
disappeared almost entirely. A Light Unseen’s last chapter
provides a blueprint for the creation of authentically Catholic
legal education grounded in the Catholic intellectual tradition.
In particular, we argue that Catholic law schools reach their
fullest expression when their teaching, scholarship, and student
formation—their intellectual hearts—employ the Catholic
intellectual tradition and its moral anthropology.
†
John M. Breen, Georgia Reithal Professor of law, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law; Lee J. Strang, John W. Stoepler Professor of Law & Values,
University of Toledo College of Law.
1
Editors Anthony Nania and Matt Dean, along with Journal advisors
Professors DeGirolami and Movsesian, performed yeoman’s labor conceiving and
executing the Symposium, and we express our heartfelt thanks to them for their
efforts.
2
Those four purposes were to: (1) provide means of upward socio-economic
mobility for Catholic immigrants and their children; (2) provide resources and
university status to the law schools’ host institutions; (3) train attorneys for the local
bar; and rarely, (4) provide a distinctively Catholic legal education.

1
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I. AUTHENTIC CATHOLIC LEGAL EDUCATION—BOTH IN PRINCIPLE
AND IN PRACTICE—CAN THRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES
The comments from the conference participants were wideranging, thoughtful, critical in a constructive fashion, and almost
always charitable.3 Most of the commentators’ remarks focused
on Chapter 5 of A Light Unseen, where we set forth a prescription
for authentic Catholic legal education. This is understandable

3

There are two instances where we believe the commentators’ significantly
misread our arguments and, in doing so, paint our arguments in an unnecessarily
harsh light.
First, Dean Vischer claims that the manuscript “convey[s] a rather
dismissive attitude toward Catholic law schools’ embrace of clinical legal education
as a case of bandwagon jumping.” Robert K. Vischer, How Distinctive Should
Catholic Law Schools Be?, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 117, 118 (2019). With respect,
we are in no way dismissive of the excellent legal work and education provided at
legal clinics sponsored by Catholic law schools. Indeed, we have elsewhere argued
that, in a Catholic setting, a law clinic can convey to the law student the basic
Christian truth about the Incarnation—that every human being is made in the
image and likeness of God, and even the poorest of the poor is simply Christ “in [a]
distressing disguise.” See MOTHER TERESA, IN THE HEART OF THE WORLD:
THOUGHTS, STORIES & PRAYERS, 23 (Becky Benenate ed., 2010). Rather, our point is
a historical one, made in response to the false claim that the clinics at Catholic law
schools were mission-driven in their origin, reflecting a desire to further manifest
their Catholic identity. We are not dismissive of clinical legal education. We are, on
historical grounds, dismissive of the claim that these clinics were of Catholic
inspiration.
Second, Dean Treanor claims that there is a “logical flaw” in our view of
Catholic legal education. William Michael Treanor, Reflections on a More “Catholic”
Catholic Legal Education, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100 (2019). Treanor claims
that, on the one hand, we argue that because Catholic law schools “are not
advancing access [for disadvantaged students] or pursuing justice very well” that
this aspect of the mission should be abandoned, but that, on the other hand, even
though Catholic law schools “are not very good at teaching the Catholic intellectual
tradition” that “we should redouble our efforts.” Id. “This,” he says, “is inconsistent.”
Id. The problem with this argument is that we nowhere argue that Catholic law
schools should abandon their efforts to make legal education accessible to those who
are disadvantaged. We acknowledge the laudable history of Catholic law schools
providing Catholic immigrants and others with the opportunity for professional
education and advancement. John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A
History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States 468–69 (Jan. 20, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the St. John’s Law Review). However,
because of the cost of legal education today and the financial position of most
Catholic law schools, we think it is unlikely that these schools will be able to
replicate this aspect of their past, creating opportunities for large numbers of
economically disadvantaged students. We do not argue that the goal is not worth
pursuing, only that it may not be realistic. We do argue that, even if Catholic law
schools were to succeed in making legal education more accessible, they,
nevertheless, will have failed in their mission if the education they provide students
is indistinguishable from their secular counterpoints. Id. There is no inconsistency
in what we argue.
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because the symposium participants are actively engaged in the
project of Catholic legal education—some for many decades.
Indeed, the commentators regularly noted how impactful their
own experiences of Catholic education have been in their lives.
In Part I of this Response, we address four major themes in
the commentators’ essays: (1) the idea that authentic Catholic
legal education can be defined entirely or for the most part by
characteristics shared with non-Catholic institutions; (2) the
claim that many or most Catholic law schools today are
authentically Catholic in their mission, curricula, programming,
and culture; (3) the claim that Catholic law schools that
intentionally embrace the Catholic intellectual tradition as a
defining feature will curtail the exercise of academic freedom;
and (4) the prediction that our prescription for authentic Catholic
legal education will be unattainable due to a lack of qualified
faculty and insufficient student demand to meet sustainable
enrollments.
A.

Defining What It Means to Be a Catholic Law School, and the
Need to Be Distinctive

A premise that underlies all of the essays, both critical and
positive, is that there is a distinction between Catholic and nonCatholic legal education. However, if the concept of “Catholic
legal education” is to be meaningful, and so have practical effect,
it must be defined. The thesis we advance in the book is that, as
part of a university, every law school is an intellectual enterprise.
As such, a Catholic law school’s Catholic identity must be
reflected in the intellectual work that it performs in teaching,
scholarship, and student formation. We argue that no matter
how many crucifixes adorn its walls, no matter how active its
campus ministry, no matter how lyrical and effusive its claimed
commitment to “social justice,” a Catholic law school must be
counted as failing in its mission if the Catholic intellectual
tradition is not reflected in its heart—in the center of its
intellectual operations.
Of course, the Catholic intellectual tradition is enormous in
scope, spanning two millennia of thought, research, reflection,
and argument, and involving every discipline and field of inquiry,
from art and architecture, to literature and criticism, history and
science, law and politics, philosophy and theology. We argue that
the one aspect of this vast tradition that a Catholic law school
must integrate into its intellectual life and introduce to its
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students, if it is to fulfill its mission, is the Church’s moral
anthropology.
A number of the commentators explicitly agree with this
thesis. Dean Vincent Rougeau says that our “idea of placing the
Catholic anthropology of the human person at the core of what a
Catholic law school does . . . strikes me as an essential part of the
institutional architecture of a Catholic law school.”4 Professor
Richard Garnett agrees that a Catholic law school must hold a
Christian moral anthropology at its center, “that is, an account of
what it means to be human, why it matters that we are, and
what it means for our lives together.”5 Likewise, Dean Robert
Vischer endorses the idea of a “Catholic anthropology [serving] as
a counterpoint to materialist/determinist theories.”6
Several of the manuscript commentators also expressly agree
with the obvious and unobjectionable claim that Catholic legal
education must be defined. Thus, Dean Kathleen Boozang sets
forth her “vision of a Catholic law school” as one that is “founded
upon the Catholic intellectual tradition embraced by a diverse
community of faculty, staff, and administration”; one that
accomplishes a “pervasive embrace of our intellectual tradition
by both indirect and direct inculcation”; and one that “serve[s] as
an intellectual hub for the Church.”7
Professor Angela Carmella answers the question of a law
school’s Catholic identity more modestly through a via negativa.
According to Carmella, “[a] law school is not the Church, just as a
university is not the Church,” and “[l]aw faculty scholarship does

4

Vincent Rougeau, Reflections on A Light Unseen, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 89,
95 (2019).
5
Richard W. Garnett, Persons and the Point of the Law, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL
STUD. 65, 69–70 (2019).
6
Vischer, supra note 3, at 120–21. Dean Vischer adds, however, that Catholic
law schools “would also benefit from having materialist/determinist theories
presented as a counterpoint to the Catholic anthropology.” Id. As the manuscript
makes plain, we believe that every idea should be open to consideration at a Catholic
university, and that would include the ancient and modern anthropologies founded
on materialism and determinism. But introducing students to these theories is not
the challenge. They are a pervasive and inescapable part of American intellectual
life, including the study of law. It would be odd to think that law students today at
every law school in the country are not already inundated with these theories, both
in their study of law, and in the popular culture they inhabit. These theories are the
baseline to which a Catholic anthropology stands as a needed alternative and
antidote.
7
Kathleen M. Boozang, A Light Unseen?, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 5, 7 (2019).

2020]

A LIGHT UNSEEN: A RESPONSE

5

not need a theologian’s nihil obstat or a bishop’s imprimatur.”8
Here, it seems, Carmella identifies “the Church” with the
Church’s hierarchy. Certainly, a Catholic law school is not
identical with the Church in this respect, but the same could be
said of any lay person or organization. Even this minimal,
negative definition is inadequate, however, in that every Catholic
individual and institution—be it a school, a university, a
hospital, a soup kitchen, or a cemetery—belongs to and is part of
the Church. Thus, when individuals and institutions ostensibly
identify themselves as “Catholic” and simultaneously
“independent” of the Church, they are contradicting themselves,9
since the fact of belonging to the Church—of being Catholic—is a
matter of communion, which is the antithesis of independence.10
Although Dean Vischer agrees with our thesis “that the
intellectual dimension of Catholic legal education is crucial,” he
worries that it fails to “capture[ ] fully the potential
distinctiveness of Catholic legal education” and that we give
undue weight to “intellectual distinctives.”11 Following Pope
John Paul II, Vischer says that a Catholic law school must be “an
authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ.”12
He identifies five qualities that distinguish Catholic legal
education including the “centrality of relationships,” the
“integration of a student’s faith commitments with his or her
professional development,” and “help[ing] a student develop a
sense of vocation.”13 These too are laudable goals, but not
specifically Catholic goals.
What Vischer sees as the undue weight we give to the
Catholic intellectual tradition in the study of law is owing to the
woeful neglect of this tradition in the practice of Catholic legal
8
Angela C. Carmella, Reflections on Breen & Strang’s A Light Unseen: A
History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States, 58 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD.
15, 20 (2019).
9
See, e.g., Mission and Values, NAT'L CATH. REP., https://www.ncronline.org
/mission-and-values [https://perma.cc/RUF7-BQLB] (last visited July 1, 2021)
(describing itself as an independent news source and as “connect[ing] Catholics to
church, faith and the common good with independent news, analysis and spiritual
reflection”).
10
See generally CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, ON SOME
ASPECTS OF THE CHURCH UNDERSTOOD AS COMMUNION (1992), http://www.vatican.va
/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_28051992_communi
onis-notio_en.html [https://perma.cc/KZF9-M8AE].
11
Vischer, supra note 3, at 119.
12
Id. (quoting JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶
21 (1990)).
13
Id.
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education since the 1960s to the current day. Our emphasis on
the intellectual tradition is not meant to “capture[ ] fully the
potential distinctiveness of Catholic legal education.”14 Rather,
we stress engagement with the tradition as a necessary
component of legal education that every Catholic law school must
perform precisely because the study of law is an intellectual
enterprise. But it is not sufficient. To fulfill its mission, a
Catholic law school should, for example, help its students develop
a sense of vocation and see the centrality of relationships in both
education and the practice of law. But even if these activities are
carried out in superb fashion, they could not obviate the need for
engagement with the tradition, for this is indispensable.
Of course, to say that a certain quality is necessary
establishes a boundary around the thing defined. According to
Dean Vischer, this sort of “ ‘in or out’ line drawing loom[s] large”
in our project.15 It reminds him of the Evangelical Christianity of
his youth which suffered from the same “preoccupation with line
drawing.”16 He colorfully contrasts Evangelical support for “the
decidedly mediocre Christian metal band Stryper rather than the
unmistakably non-Christian but brilliant Metallica” as an
example of ignoring what is excellent in favor of what is
identifiably Christian.17 He contrasts this with a Catholic
perspective which, he says, is less concerned with the “ ‘in or out’
question” and more concerned with whether a thing contributes
to “the true, the good, and the beautiful.”18
There indeed is such a thing as an obsession with linedrawing—placing something in or out of a given category—that
prevents one from appreciating the good qualities that the thing
under examination possesses. Surely, however, Vischer would
agree that some line drawing is both inevitable and desirable, if
only to avoid fraud. There are many lovely sparkling wines made
in Italy and France, but prosecco and champagne are not the
same thing, and it would be false to claim otherwise. The term
“Catholic” must have some boundaries, otherwise the term is
meaningless. Dean Vischer, of course, recognizes this fact. He
depends on the very line drawing he bemoans in promoting his
own institution, the University of St. Thomas School of Law, as
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 117.
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“a Catholic law school.”19 In doing so, he means, at least in part,
to distinguish St. Thomas from non-Catholic schools like the
University of Minnesota and Mitchell Hamline School of Law
that compete in the same market.
Furthermore, Vischer’s analogy breaks down upon closer
inspection. It would be one thing for Metallica to say, “You
should listen to our music because it is truly excellent heavy
metal.” It would be another thing for Metallica to say, “Oh, and
by the way, our music is really Catholic. This may not be
apparent to you, but it is inherent in the quality of excellence
that our music exudes.” A law school may be truly excellent—in
the breadth of its curriculum, the quality of its teaching, and in
the insightful scholarship published by its faculty. And these
qualities should be appreciated, admired, and pursued. But
these qualities do not in themselves render a school “Catholic,”
even if the school advertises itself as such. Something more is
required, and our book is in part an effort to define what this
something more is.
Dean Treanor also takes issue with boundary-drawing,
though he expresses this concern in terms of pluralism.
According to Treanor, we err in thinking “that there is only one
type of Catholic law school.”20 Treanor proposes instead that,
just as there are different religious orders within Catholicism
possessing different charisms and methods of sharing the
Gospel—Jesuits, Franciscans, and Benedictines—so too there are
“equally valid paths to a Catholic education.”21 We should, he
says, “be catholic about what it means to be a Catholic law
school”22 as there are “diverse models and paths to arrive to a
similar goal.”23
But what is that goal? Treanor doesn’t say. Surely the goal
of all law schools is to prepare law students to be competent and
ethical members of the legal profession. Beyond this, Dean
Treanor indicates that what sets Catholic law schools apart (or at
least Fordham and Georgetown, where he has taught) is that

19
About St. Thomas Law, UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS SCH. OF L., https://www.
stthomas.edu/law/about/ [https://perma.cc/ATA3-7N98] (last visited July 1, 2021).
20
Treanor, supra note 3, at 100.
21
Id. at 102.
22
Id. at 101.
23
Id. at 104. Dean Rougeau echoes the same point. Rougeau, supra note 4, at 97
(“I think the way [Breen and Strang] seek to define a law school as Catholic is one
way, but it is not the only way.”).
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they “are explicit in their commitment to justice.”24 He thinks it
is significant that the motto for Georgetown University Law
Center is “Law is but the means, – Justice is the end.”25 But an
explicit commitment to justice certainly is not a sufficient marker
of an authentic Catholic legal education. Many non-Catholic law
schools tell the world that their mission is to educate students for
justice. Northwestern’s former Dean Kim Yuracko assured
prospective students that, while the Law School is a “community
of scholars, advocates and activists” with diverse “backgrounds,
interests and passions,” they are “alike in [their] belief that law
is a force of social justice and the bedrock of a civilized society.”26
One of Cornell Law School’s mission statement goals is that its
graduates “[e]xercise with due care the role entrusted to them as
officers of the legal system and public citizens, having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”27 Dean John Manning
promotes Harvard Law School as “an exciting and productive
community in which to study, to teach, to write, to debate, to
explore, to question, to innovate, to litigate, to advocate, and to
pursue the highest ideals of law and justice.”28 If mottos on
libraries are evidence of Catholic legal education, as Dean
Treanor suggests, then Langdell Hall’s—“Non sub Homine sed
sub Deo et Lege,” is proof that Harvard is even more Catholic
than Georgetown!29
Furthermore, the meaning of “justice” is not self-evident.30
Indeed, different people often mean radically different things by

24

Treanor, supra note 3, at 101.
Id.
26
Kim Yuracko, Leadership and Strategy, NW PRITZKER SCH. OF L.,
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/about/leadership/ [http://web.archive.org/web/
20201126175413/https:/www.law.northwestern.edu/about/leadership/] (last visited
June 30, 2021).
27
Registrar’s Office, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
registrar/aba_standards.cfm [https://perma.cc/GM7M-28KW] (last visited July 1,
2021).
28
John F. Manning, Dean’s Welcome, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu
/about/deans-welcome/ [https://perma.cc/2396-94PP] (last visited July 1, 2021); see
also About, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/about/ [https://perma.cc/9DHB8QMU] (last visited July 1, 2021) (“With alumni and students as partners, they
champion law as an instrument of positive change on scales local, regional, national
and global.”).
29
Langdell Hall, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/facilities/buildingsoverview/langdell-hall/ [https://perma.cc/F83K-ZGS9] (last visited July 1, 2021).
30
See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1
(1988) (describing how the West today contains a “set of conflicting conceptions of
justice, conceptions which are strikingly at odds with one another”).
25
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use of the word. The content of this concept varies greatly
depending upon the particular theory of justice employed and the
application of that theory to a concrete set of facts. It is in fact
obvious that different views of justice can be employed to reach
radically different conclusions with respect to highly contested
issues of the day, like abortion.31 So Treanor’s assurance that
Catholic law schools define themselves by commitment to an
undefined variety of “justice” is inadequate.
Contrary to Dean Treanor’s assertion, in the manuscript we
do not contend that there is only one model for a Catholic law
school. On the contrary, we recognize that an authentically
Catholic law school could take different forms. At the same time,
it is, of course, possible for one to be so “catholic” that one is no
longer “Catholic.” A Catholic law school could seek to serve the
local community with practicing lawyers or to be counted among
the country’s elite national law schools.32 A Catholic law school
might stress public service or private practice, emphasize clinical
and experiential learning over classroom instruction, or be
recognized for a particular legal expertise such as environmental
law, intellectual property, corporate transactions, poverty law, or
the American Founding.33 Regardless of the model chosen, it is
our claim that to be authentically Catholic, a law school must
engage the Catholic intellectual tradition as it relates to
questions of law and justice, specifically by introducing students
to the Church’s moral anthropology. Nowhere in any of the nine
published responses is this basic claim explicitly rejected, let
alone refuted.34
Dean Treanor’s own model is “a Jesuit path” of “immersion
in the world and an openness to discourse among people of
different backgrounds and faiths.”35 We regard open discourse
31
Compare DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 2–3 (2003), with FRANCIS
J. BECKWITH, DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL AND LEGAL CASE AGAINST ABORTION
CHOICE xi–xiv (2007).
32
Cf. Mark Tushnet, Catholic Legal Education at a National Law School:
Reflections on the Georgetown Experience, in GEORGETOWN AT TWO HUNDRED:
FACULTY REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY’S FUTURE 321, 321–22 (William C.
McFadden ed., 1990) (arguing that Catholic law schools, insofar as they are Catholic,
cannot be national law schools).
33
See Columbus School of Law Receives $4.25 Million Gift, CATH. UNIV. AM.
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://communications.catholic.edu/news/2021/04/law-originalismgift.html [https://perma.cc/3HTA-G3NQ].
34
Even Treanor says that he “[does] not reject the model [we] offer.” Treanor,
supra note 3, at 100.
35
Id. at 102.
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among people from different backgrounds with disparate points
of view not as a specifically Jesuit quality but as a trait common
to all universities worthy of the name. Still, Treanor’s model
seems to us a reasonable approach that some, perhaps many,
Catholic law schools should take—an approach that may easily
fit under the broad umbrella of the Catholic intellectual
tradition. The key question, however, is whether Dean Treanor’s
“Jesuit path” has a purpose and means that intentionally seeks
to draw from the Catholic intellectual tradition to animate the
intellectual work performed at law school.
Related to the question of defining Catholic identity is the
question of distinctiveness. Dean Treanor believes that we focus
too much on what we “see as ‘distinctive’ about a Catholic law
school.”36 Instead, “we should embrace all the elements of our
mission, even those that we share with non-Catholic schools.”37
Thus, he argues that just because schools that are not Catholic
“have strong commitments to justice and to access . . . does not
mean that that these two commitments cannot also be hallmarks
of the mission of a Catholic law school.”38 Dean Vischer likewise
worries that for us “Catholic legal education matters only to the
extent that it is distinctive.”39 He does “not want to unduly limit
the worthy manifestations of Catholic identity to those
manifestations that are not exhibited by non-Catholic law
schools.”40
This criticism is surprising since nowhere in the manuscript
do we argue that the identity of a Catholic law school can only be
found in those features “that are not exhibited by non-Catholic
law schools.”41 It would be more accurate to say that we believe
that legal education is not Catholic legal education unless it
possesses certain qualities. It may still be excellent legal
education and so “matter” (to use Vischer’s term) in that sense,
but it would not provide the light that a Catholic worldview is
meant to bring to the study of law. We agree that Catholic law
schools should perform the aspects of their mission that they
share with non-Catholic schools. A quote, often attributed to
Martin Luther, captures the point. He is reported to have said

36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Vischer, supra note 3, at 118.
Id. at 123.
Id.
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that if he were in need of medical attention he would rather have
“an Infidel for a surgeon than a faithful butcher.”42 Likewise, a
law school that competently instructed its students in the law
and legal analysis would be superior to a thoroughly Catholic
institution that failed in these essential tasks.
As set forth in the manuscript, American legal practice and
legal education is the sort of thing that contains a lot of givenness—like other professions and trades, such as accounting and
plumbing—so that all competent American law schools will teach
the same core subjects, skills, and virtues. Every law school will
teach the principle of stare decisis, explain the rule of negligence
in torts, and guide students through basic aspects of legal
practice like filing a motion. Nothing can displace a solid
grounding in the technical knowledge of law and the acquisition
of skills necessary for the competent practice of law that all law
schools must provide to their students.
Dean Rougeau accurately summarizes our claim, that
“Catholic law schools in the United States are not distinctive in a
way that is an obvious expression of their Catholic identity, [such
that] these institutions have failed as Catholic law schools.”43 As
Professor Rick Garnett correctly notes, we believe that “if there is
any value to distinctiveness, it must be rooted in, and reflect, an
‘intellectual architecture’ ” and that “the foundation and
cornerstone of that architecture needs to be a distinctively
Christian moral ‘anthropology.’ ”44 Every law school should, as
Garnett says, educate its students in the language of law, in legal
doctrine and the tools of legal analysis, and in the policies and
normative claims behind law.45 These are features that all law
schools share in common. But a Catholic school should go beyond
this and help students see the connections between law and “the
nature and destiny of the human person.”46 This feature can
accommodate a variety of law school models while ensuring a
distinctive identity that enriches the diversity of the legal
academy.47

42

This quote has been attributed to Martin Luther but may be apocryphal.
Rougeau, supra note 4, at 90.
44
Garnett, supra note 5, at 69–70.
45
Id. at 71–72.
46
Id. at 73.
47
See John H. Garvey, Introduction, AALS Symposium on Institutional
Pluralism: The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 125,
130 (2009).
43
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The Claim That Catholic Law Schools Are Already Fulfilling
Their Mission: The Abstract Mission Fallacy and Focal Case
Analysis

Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the commentators
characterize their law schools as already fulfilling a genuinely
Catholic mission. For example, Dean Boozang states that at
Seton Hall they hope to “produce lawyers who subscribe to the
Catholic intellectual tradition.”48 She believes that “[m]uch of
what we do at Seton Hall Law School does resemble the vision
articulated by Professors Breen and Strang.”49 She then points to
a part of Seton Hall’s orientation for first-year students in which
her colleagues introduce students to different conceptions of
justice by reading Michael Sandel’s book, Justice.50 As proof that
an appreciation of justice has taken hold, she then proudly notes
that “[m]ost students conclude their tenure with us by
participating in a clinic in our Center for Social Justice.”51
Similarly, as noted above, Dean Treanor believes that
Catholic law schools are distinctive when they make explicit
their commitment to justice, something he suggests is not true of
other law schools.52 At Georgetown a commitment to justice is
“simply a given.”53 He notes that the school offers “various paths
for spiritual exercises” and “shorter courses in Jesuit
spirituality.”54 Georgetown is fulfilling its mission because it
welcomes “the active contributions of Jesuits and other clergy in
our law school’s Campus Ministry office” and because it offers
“several courses” that relate to religious faith and the law.55
Treanor believes that these features at Georgetown show that
“[the school’s] Jesuit and Catholic identities very much define[s]
it.”56
It would be uncharacteristic of a dean not to expound upon
the virtues of his or her law school, but these remarks reflect
more than institutional loyalty. They strike a defensive posture
which, notwithstanding the compliments paid to the book,
48

Boozang, supra note 7, at 7.
Id.
50
Id. (citing MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO?
(2009)).
51
Id.
52
Treanor, supra note 3, at 101.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 103.
55
Id.
56
Id.
49
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indicate a fundamental disagreement with our view that most
Catholic law schools are not fulfilling their mission as Catholic
institutions of higher learning. We argue that most law schools
operating under Catholic sponsorship fail to introduce their
students to the Catholic intellectual tradition with respect to
questions of law and justice. By contrast, Deans Boozang and
Treanor believe Catholic legal education as currently practiced is
mission focused and on track.
Although the St. John’s
symposium did not provide this backdrop, in delivering this
assessment it was easy to imagine a large banner unfurled
behind the deans declaring “Mission Accomplished!”
The discrete features that the deans highlight in their
respective law schools are certainly positive aspects of the legal
education they provide. Even when taken together, however, it is
difficult to see how they represent the fulfillment of Catholic
mission. Seton Hall is certainly doing its students a great service
by introducing them to different understandings of justice early
in their law school careers, but a brief introduction to natural law
and virtue ethics alongside libertarianism, utilitarianism, and
Rawlsian justice-as-fairness during their first-year orientation
can hardly ensure that the study of law at Seton Hall introduces
students to and forms them in the Catholic intellectual tradition.
Michael Sandel is an important philosopher, but to have students
read his book and think they have received an adequate
introduction to a Catholic moral anthropology is misleading.
Similarly, Dean Treanor is right to applaud the active
campus ministry at Georgetown University Law Center. Every
Catholic law school should provide students with the opportunity
for spiritual growth, and many non-Catholic law schools are
fortunate to have active Newman Centers attending to the
spiritual needs of their Catholic students.57 But the immediate
purpose of a law school, or any academic unit within a university,
is not devotional or liturgical, but intellectual.
Providing
members of the law school community with opportunities to
explore St. Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and other dimensions of
Jesuit spirituality is laudable, but these are no substitute for

57
See, e.g., HARV. CATHOLIC CENTER, https://www.harvardcatholic.org
[https://perma.cc/MZ8R-UU8A] (last visited June 30, 2021). Surely, Dean Treanor
must know that the fact that there are secular and non-Catholic law schools, like
Harvard, where the liturgical and other spiritual needs of Catholic students are met
demonstrates that provision of these same things at a Catholic law school is
insufficient to demonstrate the fulfillment of Catholic identity.
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presenting students with the opportunity to study American law
through the lens of the Catholic intellectual tradition and its
moral anthropology. Moreover, a handful of discrete, elective
courses in Catholic social teaching, and religion and a lawyer’s
work,58 however well intentioned, cannot accomplish this goal for
more than a handful of students. Most American law schools
expose their students to a variety of perspectives in the courses
they offer, including religious perspectives. Harvard Law School,
for instance, has offered Law and Catholic Thought: Liberalism
and Integralism, a course that addresses “[t]he social teaching of
the Catholic Church—its teaching on political, economic, and
legal justice, human dignity and rights, and the requirements of
the common good,”59 but it would be silly to suggest that Harvard
is fulfilling a Catholic mission in legal education.
1.

The Abstract Mission Fallacy

One reason why a number of commentators are able, in good
faith, to see and portray their law schools as successfully living
an authentic Catholic mission is because they employ what we
call the “abstract mission fallacy.”
This occurs when the
commentator shifts from one description of a phenomenon to a
broader, more general, and abstract description of that
phenomenon. It is an argumentative move that is ubiquitous in
the debates over constitutional interpretation, where scholars
and judges claim that the meaning of a particular constitutional
text is abstract and then leverage that abstract meaning to reach
a result that a more specific meaning would not have allowed.60
For instance, Justice Ginsburg described the Commerce Clause
as the source of congressional “authority to enact economic
legislation ‘in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union,
and also in those Cases to which the States are separately
incompetent.’ ”61 This power “to solve national problems”62 was
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Treanor, supra note 3, at 103.
Course Catalog: Law and Catholic Thought: Liberalism and Integralism,
HARV. L. SCH.
(2018),
https://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/
default.aspx?o=73633 [https://perma.cc/W3PH-UAD9].
60
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning
Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 741–57 (describing this phenomenon).
61
The Healthcare Cases, 567 U.S. 519, 600 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part).
62
Id. at 601–02.
59

2020]

A LIGHT UNSEEN: A RESPONSE

15

an abstraction from the Clause’s more specific original
meaning.63
Dean Rougeau makes this move when he progressively
recharacterizes as more and more abstract the concrete purposes
of early Catholic legal education. He accurately describes
Catholic law schools as being created “to support the needs and
aspirations of the marginalized immigrant Catholic newcomers
to American society.”64 He later recasts this purpose more
abstractly as “educating marginalized members of society,
offering them a means to seek a more fully human existence in a
new country,”65 and then, more broadly still, as a mission that
“has always been oriented toward social justice.”66
Dean Boozang makes a similar move. She states that
“[m]uch of what we do at Seton Hall Law School does resemble
the vision articulated by Professors Breen and Strang.”67 She
then explains that Seton Hall’s first year orientation is “built
around a theme of justice,” an abstraction from the tradition’s
own conception of justice.68 The students read Michael Sandel’s
Justice and “begin playing with alternative jurisprudential
theories to determine which outcomes satisfy the prerequisites of
justice.”69
Professor Carmella likewise moves from agreeing with our
thesis that the purpose of a Catholic law school requires an
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition, to the
“scholarly exploration of the relationship of law to the Catholic
intellectual tradition,” and finally to “books and articles
attempting to understand and critique law from religious
perspectives.”70
This move often occurs in the literature on Catholic legal
education. For instance, in his well-researched book, Fordham
University School of Law: A History, Robert Kaczorowski states
and then restates Fordham’s mission in abstracted form.71 Thus,
early on in his account of Fordham, Kaczorowski describes the
63

See id. at 659 (Joint Dissent) (making this point).
Rougeau, supra note 4, at 91.
65
Id. at 92.
66
Id.
67
Boozang, supra note 7, at 7.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Carmella, supra note 8, at 16−17.
71
ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: A HISTORY
5, 14 (2012).
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Law School as having a specifically Catholic mission that was
reflected in the teaching of Jurisprudence grounded in Thomistic
natural law theory.72 Even up until the early 1960s, Kaczorowski
says Fordham saw its mission as teaching law “against a
Catholic background.”73 By the end of his narrative, however,
Fordham has no specific intellectual mission. Now, Fordham’s
“distinctive characteristic” is described as being a community
with a “commitment to excellence.”74 The Law School fulfills this
abstracted mission by reflecting “the Jesuit tradition of
commitment to service and education.”75
There are three important problems with this move. First,
the abstract mission fallacy permits scholars to make an
unwarranted connection between the abstracted mission, which
is Catholic, and a particular school’s mission, and conclude that
the latter is a fulfillment of the former. For instance, social
justice is an aspect of the Catholic Church’s earthly mission, and
therefore law schools who have been and are pursuing it are
Catholic. Because the concept lacks rigor, however, the result of
the move to abstraction is invariably to approve a school’s
claimed Catholic identity. If a metric cannot identify any nonCatholic law schools, then it cannot serve as a means for judging
the fulfillment of Catholic mission in legal education. Returning
to Dean Rougeau’s claim, he abstracts from the distinct
socioeconomic motivations for the founding of Catholic law
schools to a broader social justice mission, one that is shared by
most or perhaps all American law schools today. Since all or
nearly all American law schools claim that part of their mission
is social justice, this leads to the absurd conclusion that all or
nearly all law schools are authentically Catholic, even if they do
not overtly claim that identity.
Second, the abstract mission fallacy fails to fit the historical
actors’ self-understanding. The founders and leaders of early
Catholic law schools primarily saw themselves as providing
opportunities for socioeconomic advancement for recent Catholic
immigrants and their children. This motivation properly falls
under the general heading of what we today would call social
justice, but if one uses that label without qualification or
specification, then one’s historical description will be thin and
72
73
74
75

Id. at 4–5, 15–19.
Id. at 150, 143–52.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 345.
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less accurate because it will not meaningfully correspond to the
actual historical actors’ own views and beliefs.
Third, the abstract mission fallacy enables scholars to
obscure—or perhaps blinds them to—changes to and the severe
thinning-out of Catholic identity because the law schools that
now possess this thinner mission are still “Catholic” when the
mission is stated abstractly. A law school retains its Catholic
identity pursuing “social justice” even though its mission has
materially changed from assimilating Catholic immigrants to
“evaluating and potentially dismantling the structures of our
society and economy that enrich the few . . . and move to create
new ones that dignify and uplift the lives of the many who are
weak and marginalized” today.76
2.

What It Means to Be a Catholic Law School: Focal Case
Analysis

Although we reject our commentators’ defense of the status
quo, we do not deny that Dean Boozang’s Seton Hall, and Dean
Treanor’s Georgetown, and other Catholic law schools operate
with some real sense of Catholic mission. Their efforts, however,
fail to satisfy the focal case of what a Catholic law school is.
The focal case of something is the best, most healthy, and
flourishing instance of the kind of thing that it is.77 A particular
specimen can be a more or less healthy or a more or less
developed example of a given type of organism. The focal case of
an oak tree is a tall tree with a thick trunk, large canopy,
abundant foliage, and many large acorns. But an oak tree may
have dead branches, thin foliage, and few acorns and still be an
oak tree.
This focal case analysis also applies to human institutions.
For example, natural law theorists employ it as a way of
responding to the claims of legal positivists with respect to the
status of unjust laws. Legal positivists like H.L.A. Hart hold
that an ostensible law is law if it enjoys the pedigree identified by
the authoritative rule of recognition for lawmaking within a
given legal system.78 Lon Fuller added to this that, to be law, a
given ordinance must possess certain Rule of Law qualities,
including, for example, rationality, coherence, intelligibility,
76

Rougeau, supra note 4, at 92, 95.
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9–11 (2d ed. 2011)
(describing focal case analysis).
78
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 265 (3d ed. 2012).
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accessibility, prospectivity.79 In addition to these qualities,
natural law theorists add that to satisfy the focal case of law, an
ostensible law must also possess additional characteristics
regarding the law’s substance, including that the law must
rationally advance the common good.80 A law that is a focal case
of law is one that satisfies all of these conditions.
Not every law shares in all of these characteristics. As Mark
Murphy explains, “the best way to understand the natural law
alternative to legal positivism is not as an alternative account of
legality, but as a more fully developed account of the idea of
nondefective legality.”81 Thus, a statute that is lawfully issued by
a legislature, one that is both substantively just and meets the
requirements of the Rule of Law, falls within law’s focal case. By
contrast, a statute passed by a legislature that satisfies the Rule
of Law but which discriminates against citizens in the
distribution of public benefits on the basis of race does not
advance the common good and so does not come within the focal
case of law. Such a statute is “law.” It satisfies the rule of
recognition. It is coherent, intelligible, and prospective. But
because the law is unjust, it remains a defective form of legality.
If and when a Catholic law school reaches the fullest
actualization of its potential—if it satisfies the focal case of
Catholic legal education—it will be distinctive. Catholic legal
education’s focal case is excellent Catholic legal education. A
Catholic law school at its best employs the Catholic intellectual
tradition to research and write about legal questions, to teach
law, and to form attorneys with the requisite knowledge, skills,
and habits to practice American law at the highest level. The
Catholic intellectual tradition is an essential aspect of flourishing
Catholic legal education because it provides the resources to
structure and justify its essential core, its intellectual heart.
From the theoretical and foundational to the practical and
mundane, the Catholic intellectual tradition has the capacity to
structure legal education. From the tradition’s description of the
human person, who is simultaneously the subject and end of law,
to the regalia worn by graduates, which can be traced back to the
cowls worn by monks, the tradition can give Catholic character to
legal education. In the manuscript, we described how the

79
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See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 42–43 (rev. ed. 1969).
See FINNIS, supra note 77, at 27 (describing the focal case of law).
MARK C. MURPHY, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THE FUNDAMENTALS 44 (2007).
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Catholic intellectual tradition should inform the structure and
contribute to the excellence of Catholic legal education:
One would expect that an academic institution (such as a law
school) that claimed to be founded under a Catholic inspiration
would be animated by Catholic ideas that informed the
substance of its operations. In particular, one would expect that
the Catholic understanding of the law in general (jurisprudence)
and in a particular jurisdiction (the positive law) as well as the
ultimate subject of law (the human person) and the end of law
(justice) would inform a Catholic law school in the curriculum it
offered, the teaching methods it employed, the questions it
posed, and the scholarly answers it[] proposed.82

A Catholic law school that provided “access and commitment to
justice,”83 one that educated and assimilated immigrants and
outsiders84 and advanced “social justice,”85 one that was “an
authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ”86
would fall short of its potential because in addition to these
worthy activities, it can and should also employ the tradition in
its scholarship, teaching, and formation.
The Catholic
intellectual tradition must reside in its intellectual essence.
The position we advance in the manuscript does not preclude
the possibility—indeed, we see it as a likelihood—that actual, onthe-ground Catholic law schools will not fully actualize their
potential. They will not satisfy the focal case of what it means to
be a Catholic law school. It is likely that most Catholic law
schools will lack some of the characteristics of a fully actualized
Catholic law school. Some Catholic law school faculties will
teach their class subjects without utilizing the tradition to
justify, elucidate, and criticize the doctrines they teach.
Similarly, some Catholic law schools may teach their graduates
to treat legal practice as solely about earning a living, obtaining
social standing, or access to power, and not as a personal
vocation to provide justice to persons in need. Likewise, some
Catholic law school clinics will teach the procedure and skills of
American legal practice, without emphasis on the virtues lawyers
82

Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 8.
Treanor, supra note 3, at 100.
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Rougeau, supra note 4, at 91.
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Id. at 92.
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Vischer, supra note 3, at 119 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC
CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶ 21 (1990)). To be clear, Dean Vischer does
not exclude other aspects of the tradition, especially its “intellectual dimension”; he
claims that the mission is broader than an intellectual framework. Id.
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need to possess: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and especially
justice. In other words, these Catholic law schools may carry the
banner “Catholic” but will be indistinguishable from non-Catholic
law schools regarding these facets of their programs. These
schools may rightly be regarded as Catholic, but they are
deficient in the realization of their Catholic identity.
The prescription set forth in the manuscript has the capacity
to identify Catholic law schools that, to a greater or lesser degree,
fulfill their potential. This capacity to identify gradations is
itself a virtue that reflects the lived reality of how human beings
and human institutions actualize themselves. Individual human
beings characteristically fail to live up to their potential in many
ways.87 We tell “white lies,” we eat one piece of chocolate too
many, and we fail to appreciate our family members. Human
institutions, too, fail to achieve their potential with regularity.
Scientific panels of experts may be influenced by considerations
outside their technical field of competence.88 The focal case
analysis offered here identifies what makes a law school
authentically Catholic. Moreover, because it can explain why
and in what ways law schools regularly fail to fully utilize the
Catholic intellectual tradition, it allows us to acknowledge the
Catholic identity of Catholic law schools today while pointing to
the ultimately inadequate expression of that identity.
In sum, Catholic legal education must be distinctive in order
for it to merit the label Catholic. It must possess distinct
qualities to achieve its distinctive goals, even if many of these
qualities overlap with those of non-Catholic law schools. We
argue that a Catholic law school whose purpose and means are
87

Indeed, Christianity’s explanation for this typical human failing—original
sin—gives Christianity significant explanatory power. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra
note 30, at 154–58 (explaining St. Augustine’s conception of human will and its
relatively greater explanatory power over Aristotle’s).
88
See, e.g., Mallory Simon, Over 1000 Health Professionals Sign a Letter Saying,
Don’t Shut Down Protests Using Coronavirus Concerns as an Excuse, CNN (June 5,
2020, 9:08 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/health/health-care-open-letterprotests-coronavirus-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/H49C-DDFV] (summarizing a
letter sign by public health experts who had previously claimed that gathering in
crowds for work, or recreation, or worship posed an unacceptable risk for spreading
the Coronavirus but then claimed that gathering in crowds to protest racism does
not because racism is an important public health issue). This is not a new
phenomenon. For example, American atomic scientists leveraged their expertise in
public policy debates at the dawn of the atomic age to make claims beyond their
expertise. S. Waqar H. Zaidi, Scientists as Political Experts: Atomic Scientists and
their Claims for Expertise on International Relations, 1945-1947, 63 CENTAURUS 17
(2021).
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taken from the Catholic intellectual tradition would merit such a
label.
By contrast, the commentators’ contention—that a Catholic
law school that is identical to a non-Catholic law school may still
be regarded as authentically Catholic—is only partially accurate.
Such a law school could indeed be Catholic, but it would be an
immature, stunted, warped, or even diseased version of Catholic
legal education. Such a Catholic law school may indeed provide
access to legal education for immigrants and other disadvantaged
groups, or it may in fact inculcate the pursuit of justice and
public service in its graduates. These would indeed be marks of a
Catholic mission even though they are shared with most nonCatholic law schools.89 However, if these are the sole or primary
ways in which a Catholic law school advances its mission—if its
faculty members do not teach their subjects and engage in their
scholarship with the Catholic intellectual tradition in mind, and
if its students do not learn how to live their vocations well—then
that law school has failed to achieve its potential.90
Dean Vischer accurately states that a Catholic law school
should be “an authentic human community animated by the
spirit of Christ.”91 This is clearly an identity to which every
Catholic law school should conform and one moreover that cannot
animate secular law schools.
Even this Catholic mission,
however, is inadequate to serve as a justification for Catholic
legal education without significant elaboration as to the
substance of its academic course of study and intellectual life.
Many communities and organizations profess to be animated by
Christ’s Spirit—soup kitchens, credit unions, scouting troops,
and medical schools—but only those communities whose
fundamental intellectual activities are legal scholarship, law
teaching, and student formation, and that are performed drawing
on the riches of the Catholic intellectual tradition, can claim to be
a Catholic law school in the focal case, animated by the Spirit of
Christ.
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See Garnett, supra note 5, at 69 (agreeing with this point).
It is because a fully flourishing Catholic law school’s intellectual activities are
enhanced by the Catholic intellectual tradition that Professor Garnett argued that
the “Catholic law school project” would be or is a new phenomenon, one not
previously accomplished. Id. at 65–66.
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Examining the Deans’ factual claims through the lens of our
focal case analysis suggests that they provide little evidence that
Catholic law schools currently have a Catholic mission. We
noted earlier that Dean Treanor’s evidence that Fordham and
Georgetown are authentically Catholic is that the “Catholic law
schools where I have taught are explicit in their commitment to
justice.”92 As should be clear now, an explicit commitment to
justice is not, by itself, sufficient evidence that the Catholic law
school is flourishing. A commitment to justice is an aspect of a
full Catholic law school, but if the law school lacks engagement
with the Catholic intellectual tradition in its scholarship,
teaching, and mentorship, it has yet to fully actualize its
potential.
Dean Treanor also focuses on Catholic law schools’ clinical
programs as evidence of those schools’ Catholic missions. He
claims that both Fordham’s and Georgetown’s clinical programs
reflect not only “a pedagogic commitment” but are evidence of
each school’s commitment to equip graduates “to work to make
this a more just world,”93 a sentiment he hears affirmed by his
“fellow Catholic law school deans.”94 This, he says, is evidence of
mission that “may not show up in the formal accreditation
documents submitted to the ABA” but is nonetheless real.95
This is pretty thin stuff. Georgetown’s own public materials
about its clinics fail to reference either their Catholic inspiration
or mission to “make this a more just world.”96 More importantly,
our claim is not that there was no evidence of Catholic mission of
clinics in “formal accreditation documents,” though that is true.97
As set forth in the manuscript, our archival research has
uncovered little evidence anywhere that Catholic law schools
created clinics to fulfill their Catholic mission. The evidence we
have found in the historical record is that Catholic law schools
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Clinics, G EO . L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/experiential-learning/
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created clinics, like their secular peers, to help their students
acquire skills and prepare for the world of legal practice.98
We agree that, within any institution, there are ideas and
commitments that go unnoticed by the outside observer. Even
though they are not spelled out in a mission statement or policy
manual, these ideas and commitments may be part of the culture
of the place that deeply inform its day-to-day operations. Still, in
the absence of any explicit reference to Catholic mission with
respect to a law school’s clinical programs, it is too easy for a
dean to simply declare that every aspect of the school is infused
with a sense of mission: “It’s there! You just can’t see it. Our
Catholic mission may not be visible to the untrained eye, but it’s
pervasive. It’s in the very air we breathe.” But sweeping
assertions like these must give way when specific questions are
posed. For example, how does Georgetown’s Women’s Law &
Public Policy Fellowship Program,99 which serves as a pipeline to
organizations working to advance abortion rights both at home
and abroad,100 draw inspiration from Georgetown’s Catholic
mission?
A number of commentators claim that the founding mission
of Catholic law schools was the pursuit of social justice, and that
today they continue to carry out that mission, though with
varying degree of success.
Dean Rougeau, for instance,
characterizes the early mission of Catholic law schools as
“educ[ating] and assimilat[ing] mostly poor, often illiterate,
immigrant outsiders . . . .”101 This mission is a clearly Catholic
mission because it “is deeply consistent with priorities Jesus
announces in the Gospels,”102 one of “social justice.”103 Dean
Treanor states that Fordham and Georgetown are authentically
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See, e.g., Experiential Education, F ORDHAM U NIV . S CH . L.,
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23615/experiential_education [https://perma.cc/4CZQCUVQ] (last visited June 30, 2021). “In recognition of the importance of clinical and
experiential education in preparing students for the practice of law, Fordham Law
School guarantees to every” student a clinical opportunity. Id.
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See generally Women’s Law & Public Policy Fellowship Program, GEO. UNIV.
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visited June 30, 2021).
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Catholic because they “are explicit in their commitment to
justice.”104
Our focal case analysis suggests that a law school’s
intellectual activities have to be enriched by the resources of the
Catholic intellectual tradition in order for the school to be fully
Catholic. A law school that in fact pursued social justice would
be doing a very good thing. But that alone would not make it an
authentically Catholic law school. Instead, at best, it would be a
partially Catholic law school because its essential aspects lacked
engagement with the tradition—an oak tree with thin foliage and
few acorns.
Professor Angela Carmella takes up our claim that the
Catholic identity of a law school must have an intellectual
dimension. She identifies several important scholarly works over
the past twenty-five years as evidence of scholarly engagement
with the Catholic intellectual tradition,105 including a book that
she edited and to which she contributed.106 Professor Carmella
concludes that “many professors at Catholic law schools (and
Catholic law professors at non-Catholic schools) have been
building a body of scholarship on Catholic perspectives on
various fields of law and jurisprudential schools of thought.”107
She suggests that this robust body of work “should serve to
temper the conclusion that ‘[t]here is next to nothing about their
faculty and faculty scholarship . . . that set them apart from the
mine-run of American law schools.’ ”108
These are fair points, and we do not wish to diminish the
real and good work being done currently with the Catholic
intellectual tradition,109 but we believe Professor Carmella
overstates the significance and distinctiveness of Catholic law
faculty and their scholarship.
First, Professor Carmella’s
argument, like the arguments of other commentators, moves
from the particular—“scholarly exploration of the relationship of
law to the Catholic intellectual tradition”—to the abstract—
104
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“books and articles attempting to understand and critique law
from religious perspectives.”110 The former is a much smaller
category than the latter, and the former is what is necessary for
the full flourishing of a Catholic law school’s mission.
Second, the examples given by Professor Carmella as
evidence of Catholic law school engagement with the Catholic
intellectual tradition are evidence of such engagement, but only
thin evidence. Professor Carmella describes these faculty as
“engage[d] in religion and law teaching, or scholarship, or
both.”111 This label already shows that the scholars are not
necessarily engaged with the Catholic intellectual tradition.
Moreover, numerous scholars at law schools across the country
are “engage[d] in religion and law,”112 which is understood to
refer to the study of religious liberty and church-state
relationships. Many non-Catholic law schools have centers and
institutes devoted to this field.113 Two of the scholars described
by Professor Carmella are engaged in studying “Evangelical
Protestant Thought” and “Islam,” which may include engagement
with the Catholic intellectual tradition, but if so, it is not obvious;
Out of fifty-three current, full-time faculty at Seton Hall,
Professor Carmella identifies only four who appear to be engaged
in the Catholic intellectual tradition in their scholarship.114 That
is approximately seven percent of the faculty. Seton Hall’s Dean,
Kathleen Boozang, endorses the idea of a “critical mass” of
faculty who take up the intellectual mission of a Catholic law
school,115 but seven percent is nowhere close to a critical mass,
much less a majority of the faculty. Professor Carmella also
points to two emeritus faculty who are engaged with the Catholic
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intellectual tradition and one who is engaged in Islam.116 While
emeritus faculty in many instances contribute greatly to a
faculty, their scholarly engagement typically diminishes over
time, and they no longer participate in the governance of the law
school. In sum, it may well be true that Seton Hall has
“consistently encouraged” Carmella and her colleagues to pursue
their Catholic and other religious interests in the law,117 but the
data she cites hardly proves that Seton Hall has an institutional
commitment to engagement with the Catholic intellectual
tradition in its intellectual heart of scholarship, teaching, and
student mentorship.
Professor Amy Uelmen identifies what she says is “the most
urgent task for Catholic law schools” today, namely “to help
students reflect on the question of how to make the connection
between the difficult cultural, social, and institutional questions
that they will face as attorneys, in the light of critical reflection
on their own deep values systems.”118 It appears that Professor
Uelmen believes that the mission of Catholic legal education is
“to facilitate reflection on the actual connections that students
make with their own values—and with problems in the world”119
because this is what law students need to prepare them for legal
practice.120 According to Uelmen, “[t]he distinctive purpose, the
point of Catholic legal education, should be framed in terms of
the problems that future lawyers will encounter in the world.”121
This focus is driven by a theology of the laity’s role in the secular
world.122 Uelmen says she agrees that natural law, Catholic
social thought, and various aspects of the intellectual tradition
“are all valuable bodies of work for raising critical questions
regarding a deep values structure.”123 She insists that she does
not seek to “discard the robust resources of the Tradition” but
wants to “place much greater emphasis on the methods for
helping students to engage these questions.”124
116
Carmella, supra note 8, at 17 n.8 (Professors McCauliff, Coverdale, and
Freamon.).
117
Carmella, supra note 8, at 17 n.8.
118
Amelia J. Uelmen, The Distinctive Questions of Catholics in History, 58 J.
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 105, 110 (2019).
119
Id. at 112.
120
Id. at 111–12.
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Id.
122
See id. at 112 (“[T]he theological education of lay people should be shaped by
their distinct roles and tasks in the world.”) (citation omitted).
123
Id. at 110.
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Id. at 112.
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We believe that Professor Uelmen’s prescription for Catholic
legal education could be consistent with our proposal, or it may
fall seriously short of what we prescribe. There is nothing in our
proposal that precludes connecting students with resources from
the tradition so they may best navigate their professional lives.
Nor did we counsel avoiding the existential questions students
will have about themselves and their vocations. Indeed, we
argued that authentic Catholic legal education will work hard to
equip students with the knowledge, skills, and habits they need
to thrive in professional settings to live out their vocation. On
this compatibilist reading, Professor Uelmen provides useful
concrete guidance about how Catholic law schools can do so.
We also think it is possible to read Professor Uelmen’s essay
as incompatible with our prescription, as downplaying and
maybe eliminating Catholic legal education’s “overarching
conceptual system” in favor of “methods” to help students
address the deep questions of law, justice, and vocation.125 The
Catholic intellectual tradition has given rise to a host of methods
in a variety of disciplines, but the tradition “is not merely
methodological or procedural but substantive in nature.”126 It is
one thing for Uelmen to recommend that we need to move
“beyond podium-style explanations of intellectual categories and
content”127 as ineffective given the current generation of law
students. It is quite another thing to suggest that a Catholic law
school can fulfill its mission in a solely methodological fashion
without regard to the intellectual content it shares with students.
If that is Professor Uelmen’s meaning, then her suggestion is not
compatible with our thesis. Catholic legal education is the sort of
thing that is best when it is distinctive in its many dimensions,
not only in its preparation of students, but also in its intellectual
life, in the scholarship and teaching of its faculty. Professor
Uelmen’s account is too narrow because it focuses on student
experiences, but says very little about faculty and their
scholarship and teaching.
To see how this interpretation of Professor Uelmen’s account
would fall short of authentic Catholic legal education, imagine a
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Id. at 110, 112.
John M. Breen, Action as the Fruit of Contemplation: A Reply to Bryce,
Donnelly, Kalscheur, and Nussbaum, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 645, 665 (2007/2008)
(critiquing Rev. Gregory Kalscheur, S.J.’s defense of Jesuit education as a method or
“way of proceeding”).
127
Uelmen, supra note 118, at 112.
126

28

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 59:1

Catholic law school that sought to reach its students “where they
are, just as they are” and to “help[ ] them integrate their personal
and religious values into their professional identity.”128 Imagine
further that the school is populated with students who oppose
religious liberty, as well as faculty who support this point of view
and publish scholarly articles arguing that religious liberty and
conscience exceptions are used as a tool of discrimination and a
cudgel to limit the freedom of non-believers. It appears that if
such a Catholic law school with such a faculty were to help such
law students more fully understand why religious liberty is
wrong and encourage such students to connect their beliefs with
their future practice—taking clients who argued against religious
liberty—then this would seem to be in keeping with the idea of
Catholic identity understood simply as a method. That is, such a
school would seem to “help students reflect on the question of
how to make the connection between the difficult cultural, social,
and institutional questions that they will face as attorneys, in the
light of critical reflection on their own deep values systems.”129 If
this reading of Uelmen’s proposal of Catholic identity is correct—
wherein methodology overshadows content—then our vision of
Catholic legal education would be inconsistent with it, as
Uelmen’s proposal would fail to describe Catholic legal education
in its focal case.
C.

Big Tent Catholicism and the Fear That Authentic Catholic
Identity Will Threaten Academic Freedom

Several commentators believe that the vision for Catholic
legal education that we set forth in the manuscript is overly
narrow. There are, says Dean Treanor, “diverse models and
paths”130 that Catholic legal education can take. According to
Dean Rougeau, the way in which we “seek to define a law school
as Catholic is one way, but it is not the only way.”131 Moreover,
modern university life is defined by academic freedom. Professor
Carmella reminds us that “the Church itself is internally divided
in many ways”132 and that Catholic law schools must embrace the
diversity of views within the Church. In other words, Catholic
legal education must accommodate “big tent Catholicism.”
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 115.
Id. at 110.
Treanor, supra note 3, at 104.
Rougeau, supra note 4, at 97.
Carmella, supra note 8, at 21.
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Professor Carmella fears that our purportedly narrow
conception of Catholic legal education may not encourage the
Catholic intellectual tradition “in its fullness and diversity” but
may instead be employed as a vehicle for the “revival of
orthodoxy.”133 Carmella rightly praises “the complexity and
depth of the tradition”—a tradition “pulling in thousands of years
of classical, biblical, theological, and philosophical reflection.”134
Moreover, she sees the breadth of the tradition as “critical to the
success of any curriculum change or program of faculty
scholarship.”135 “We should,” she says, “welcome discourse with
any scholars who engage the tradition” including those “who
explicitly reject elements in the tradition.”136 However, Carmella
is worried that, because we recognize that there are “central and
mandatory facets of the tradition,”137 our proposal for the
integration of the tradition into Catholic law school curricula will
be “overshadowed by concerns about orthodoxy” and “the specter
of censorship.”138 Dean Boozang is similarly alarmed by our
claim that academic freedom at a Catholic law school should
extend to “areas of ‘reasonable debate and discussion’ ” about the
Catholic intellectual tradition.139 She says this implies that there
are positions that fall outside the tradition, yet faculty need
unfettered freedom to consider the hard questions that may
arise.140
We agree with Carmella and Boozang that, with respect to
academic freedom, the manuscript is underdeveloped, and we
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Id. at 16. We do indeed refer to a “revival of orthodoxy” in the manuscript,
but we do so in the context of referring to the Church’s turning away from the worst
of the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council in terms of theology, catechesis, and
liturgy. The Church’s struggles in the wake of the council are well documented.
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appreciate their constructive criticism. Still, a few points can be
said by way of response.
First, we acknowledge that “even for those central and
mandatory facets of the tradition, Catholic legal scholars may
reasonably engage with different implications of those facets.”141
Thus, when Carmella argues that there are tenets of the
tradition that must be acknowledged (for example, the institution
of private property and the reality of human agency) she also
notes that these beliefs can be examined in a variety of ways
from within the tradition (for instance, the idea that property
rights are subject to a “social mortgage” and the possibility of
circumstances that diminish the exercise of human freedom and
so reduce culpability).142 This is “the complexity and depth of the
tradition”143 on display to which Carmella refers, and it is
something that all Catholic law schools should happily welcome.
Second, an honest assessment of legal academia today would
recognize that there is no shortage of law professors who reject
core elements of the Catholic intellectual tradition, including
such foundational beliefs as the inherent dignity of every human
being. As Professor Collett notes in her response, this includes
faculty members at Catholic law schools across the country.144
“Engagement” with the tradition can take many forms: from
whole-hearted endorsement to rote repetition, to harmonious
extension, to friendly critique, and outright repudiation. Insofar
as it is intellectually honest, each of these forms of engagement
should be welcomed. But the problem in Catholic legal education
is not a dearth of faculty who engage with the tradition through
critique and repudiation. Just the opposite—the problem is the
paltry number of faculty who have a competent grasp of the
tradition and who are willing and able to engage it constructively
in their scholarship and teaching. While different forms of
engagement are welcome, “it cannot be the case that the
exclusive or even predominant mode of engagement with the
Catholic intellectual tradition is one of repudiation and
critique.”145 A Catholic law school that did as much would merely
141
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replicate what is already taking place at non-Catholic and
secular law schools.
Third, the commentators are right to note the capacious
nature of the Catholic intellectual tradition. The tradition is
indeed a vast country—full of peaks, valleys, and great plains,
teeming cities and empty desert—but it is not a country without
borders. One can wander outside its wide expanse, even as one
claims to be in-country. Big as the tent is, it is possible to step
outside its flaps.
There are premises, propositions, and
arguments that lie outside the tradition, and these stake out
definite positions that are inimical to a genuinely Catholic vision
of a just society. Contrary to what Carmella says, nowhere do we
raise “the specter of censorship.”146 Elsewhere we have suggested
that Catholic universities may legitimately approach the
question maintaining both Catholic identity and academic
freedom in different ways,147 but we have not endorsed any one
approach.
If a law school is committed to structuring its activities
within the Catholic intellectual tradition, there is simply no
getting around the line-drawing concern raised by Boozang and
Carmella. One cannot say that there are no boundaries because,
in theory and in practice, that is inconsistent with the tradition
itself. But, if one recognizes that there are boundaries to the
tradition, then one must draw lines. We acknowledge that there
will be reasonable disagreement about where those lines should
be drawn, and by whom they should be drawn. Our proposal
would locate the locus of decision-making within different bodies
and persons, depending on the institution. This solution will
lead to different on-the-ground interpretations of the tradition.
Fourth, and relatedly, the word “orthodoxy” draws shudders
from faculty members at all law schools (including Catholic
schools) conjuring up images of religious authorities wielding
political power. This is understandable as the life of an academic
is supposed to be a life free of enforced conformity in research,
publication, and belief. Still, there are orthodoxies to which most
members of the legal academy subscribe, opposition to which may
preclude initial employment, success in publication, and
professional advancement. Support for abortion rights is one
146
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such orthodoxy. Here Professor Carmella’s and Dean Boozang’s
remarks seem designed to preserve the status quo. Their
comments seek to make room on Catholic law school faculties for
support for abortion and the other positions on matters where
the Church is a beacon of light in what Pope John Paul II
referred to as the “culture of death”148 and what Pope Francis has
termed a “throwaway culture.”149 Thus, Boozang defends her
scholarship on Catholic hospitals and “women’s access to
healthcare services”150 wherein she argues that, where a religious
accommodation is not achievable, “the state should require the
religious hospital to provide the required health services
[including contraceptive services and sterilization by Catholic
hospitals], or condition licensure or certificate of need approval of
the merged entity on the arrangement of an alternative provider
of services.”151
For her part, Carmella correctly notes that the Catholic
tradition includes the distinction between law and morality and
maintains that not everything immoral ought to be subject to
criminal penalty.152 She also declares, without arguing, that laws
outlawing abortion would not be efficacious. Carmella also cites
to Greg Kalschur, S.J.’s interpretation of John Courtney Murray,
S.J., that law must be supported by a “consensus” before being
brought into effect.153 These claims—the need for “consensus”
before pro-life measures are adopted, and the supposed lack of
efficacy enjoyed by those measures—can be answered by drawing
upon resources within the tradition, as well as other fields of
Again, the fact that these sorts of
human knowledge.154
148
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arguments can take place are a testament to “the complexity and
depth of the tradition.”155 Nevertheless, some things remain
irretrievably outside the tradition. Because abortion is the direct
killing of an innocent human being156 the positive law “cannot
declare to be right what would be opposed to the natural
law . . . .”157
While public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop
to something which—were it prohibited—would cause more
serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize as a right of
individuals . . . an offence against other persons caused by the
disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life.158

Yet the right to kill an unborn child through abortion is either
the premise or the conclusion in the abortion scholarship by law
professors at Catholic and non-Catholic law schools alike. A law
school that seeks to hire faculty who write in favor of abortion,
who seek to advance a throwaway culture, does not live an
authentic Catholic mission.
Dean Boozang appears to believe that our prescription
requires that all, or almost all, faculty, and students, should be
Catholic. That is not our position for a number of reasons, and
we nowhere endorse any such view in the manuscript. First,
Dean Boozang and other commentators claim that there are
many faculty who could be considered to be “Catholic
intellectuals who subscribe to the tradition though not
Catholic . . . .”159 That is an obvious fact that we acknowledge in
the manuscript. Thus, we argued that an excellent Catholic law
school would also include non-Catholic, mission-fit faculty from
other religious traditions, and none at all, because of the valuable
and representative perspectives these faculty would bring to the
school, its classrooms, its scholarship, and its public service.

Prophet, and King: Abortion, the Vocation of Catholic Politicians, and the Culture of
Life, 6 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 353, 356 (2009). For a refutation of the claim that
prohibitions against abortion prior to Roe v. Wade were ineffective that draws upon
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L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 221–22, 224–26 (2008).
155
Carmella, supra note 8, at 19.
156
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE ¶58 (1995)
[hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
157
SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON
PROCURED ABORTION QUESTIO DE ABORTU ¶ 21 (1974).
158
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 156, ¶ 71.
159
Boozang, supra note 7, at 8.

34

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 59:1

Second, we made clear in the manuscript that the study of
law is not like the study of theology in many ways. Catholic
theology is theology done by the Church, so only men and women
incorporated into the Body of Christ have the capacity to do it.
Only those men and women who have received the faith can
attend to the task of theology which is “to understand the
meaning of revelation” and so “illumine one or other aspect of the
There is nothing about law, legal
mysteries of faith.”160
scholarship, and teaching that requires the supernatural virtues
and membership in the Church.161 Therefore, in principle, nonCatholics may participate in a Catholic law school’s intellectual
activities.
Third, our core contention in the manuscript is that a critical
mass of the faculty at a Catholic law school should be practicing
Catholics, and that other non-Catholic faculty should be
knowledgeable about and supportive of the school’s mission.
Ideally, Catholic members of the faculty would not simply be
Catholic in name only, or simply in their faith and religious
practice, but Catholic intellectuals—men and women whose
perspective on law is drawn from the Catholic intellectual
tradition. A critical mass of Catholic faculty is crucial because
such faculty will, by virtue of their communion with the Church,
likely have a disposition of loyalty to the Catholic intellectual
tradition and some knowledge of it.
In this regard, our
prescription parallels Professor Collett’s summary of the
Church’s law governing the composition of Catholic university
faculties.162 Ex Corde Ecclesiae and the USCCB’s Application of
Ex Corde both require that a majority of faculty at Catholic
universities be faithful Catholics.163 This is a commonsensical,
practical approach to the problem of identity.

160
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON THE
ECCLESIAL VOCATION OF THE THEOLOGIAN DONUM VERITATIS ¶10 (1990). To be
clear, we are not claiming that non-Catholic or non-Christian theologians would not
add value to a Catholic theology department. We are claiming that they cannot
perform the work of Catholic theology.
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D. No Market, No Mission: The Impractical Nature of Authentic
Catholic Legal Education
Several of the commentators maintain that the vision of
Catholic legal education we set forth in the manuscript is
impractical and ultimately unworkable for two reasons. These
reasons concern the ability of authentic Catholic law schools to
attract students interested in the school and to attract faculty
capable of carrying forward the mission.
First, the commentators argue that a law school that lives
out an authentic Catholic mission, as we have described it, will
be unable to attract a sufficient number of students to sustain
the institution financially. Dean Boozang bluntly states that
“the business model of today’s law schools cannot support schools
She
that adopt the vision urged by A Light Unseen.”164
incorrectly suggests that our model for Catholic legal education
“focus[es] exclusively on education by or of Catholic lawyers.”165
Although we nowhere argue or imply that a genuine Catholic
legal education should be limited to students who are Catholic in
background, she nonetheless argues that the model she
attributes to us is impractical.
The economics of today’s law school market do not give most of
us the luxury of intentionally recruiting a student body that is
predominantly Catholic. Nor do I think that this is a good idea.
The value of the Catholic intellectual tradition is such that we
should seek to teach it beyond those who self-identify as
Catholic.166

According to Boozang, “the law school market will [not] support
more than a handful of schools that adhere to the model” set
forth in the manuscript.167 She believes that
[w]hile a core number of Catholic students will unquestionably
be drawn to the kind of Catholic law school the authors
describe, [she does] not believe a sufficient number of students
qualified for success in law school and on the bar exist to
support the over twenty law schools the authors urge to
subscribe to this model.168

The reason for this alleged lack of demand is that “[f]ew of
today’s aspiring law students are sufficiently rigorously educated
164
165
166
167
168
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in their faith to thrive at law schools that adopt the model
advanced.”169 Indeed, she says that, combined with the effects of
COVID-19, law schools following our model would “position
themselves for the demographic cliff.”170
Dean Rougeau likewise recognizes that “Catholic law schools
need to survive in an intensely competitive higher education
Given these
market” but that many are “struggling.”171
circumstances, he fears that some Catholic schools “will not
survive the current economic crisis and will likely close.”172 Like
Boozang, he worries whether the distinctively Catholic law school
that we describe “will have broad appeal to students who want
the best possible legal education.”173 He suspects that the allure
of a legal education through the lens of the Catholic tradition
may not be appreciated by students with “more prosaic concerns”
such as “limiting their educational debt and finding meaningful,
reasonably remunerative employment.”174 Thus, he is “not fully
convinced that [our proposal] provides the kind of [law
school] . . . that will have broad appeal to students who want the
best possible legal education.”175
The second impracticality identified by the commentators is
the dearth of a sufficient number of legal academics capable of
carrying out the project. Because the project of authentic
Catholic legal education is intellectual in nature, it requires
intellectuals to carry it out. As Professor Richard Garnett notes,
“any distinctiveness with respect to character and mission [of
Catholic law schools] depends on personnel—administrators,
staff, students, but especially faculty—who see that
distinctiveness as something to be pursued, valued, and
protected.”176
Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski agrees with this assessment.
He recalls the history—recounted in the book—when the
proposal to reform Catholic legal education in the middle of the
twentieth century failed in part because schools were unable to
hire sufficient numbers of competent faculty. According to
Pojanowski, the challenges today are even greater. “The pool of
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
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candidates to staff such a law school is even smaller, what with
feeble catechesis, the waning institutional strength of the
Church, and the increased secularization of American society and
education.”177
Dean Boozang is similarly pessimistic. She “doubt[s] that a
sufficient number of Catholic aspiring academics exist to staff all
of the Catholic law schools in the country.”178 Just as there was a
“paucity of professors” to carry on the mission in the past, so
today there are few candidates “familiar with the Catholic
intellectual tradition, [and] also qualified for whatever subject
matter needs the particular law school has.”179
Another practical limitation on the program of reform we
propose almost goes unmentioned in the commentators’ remarks.
This constraint stems not from the supply side of faculty talent,
but the demand side. Today, most established faculty at Catholic
law schools “would be downright hostile, rather than merely
indifferent, to reorientation around natural law jurisprudence
and the broader Catholic intellectual tradition.”180 Amidst all the
positive responses to the manuscript, and the many references by
commentators to this program or that faculty member as
evidence that their schools are in fact genuinely Catholic,
Professor Pojanowski, his colleague Rick Garnett, and Teresa
Collett are the only commentators with the candor to note the
obvious: that many faculty regard a Catholic law school’s
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We do not contend that when a majority of a law school’s faculty members
check the “practicing Catholic” box the school’s Catholic identity and the fulfillment
of an authentic mission is assured. Boozang can cite to no passage in the text where
we offer this view because it does not exist. We do, however, predict that practicing
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mission. Does anyone really believe otherwise? We also suggest, as a practical
matter, that those faculty who adhere to the Catholic faith are more likely to be
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distinctive mission as “an oddity to be hidden or an obstacle to be
overcome.”181
These are all serious challenges. Because we offer our
proposal as an actual program for reform, we are delighted that
many of the commentators evaluated the practical viability of our
prescription for authentic Catholic legal education. A great idea
for a product that has no market will not get made, and an
excellent legal education without faculty or students will not
thrive.
First, with respect to faculty, we agree there is an
insufficient number of mission-fit faculty to staff all existing law
schools operating under Catholic auspices.
The “feeble
catechesis, the waning institutional strength of the Church, and
the increased secularization of American society and education”
that Professor Pojanowski bemoans pose significant limitations
on the pool of qualified faculty candidates.182 Demographically
and statistically, it is unusual for a person to have the
inclinations and opportunities to be knowledgeable about the
Catholic intellectual tradition. Few Americans attend Catholic
schools from kindergarten to college, and the percentage of those
who receive an academically excellent and orthodox education is
smaller still. Moreover, if a person wished to master the
tradition on his or her own, it would be difficult without someone
knowledgeable to encourage and guide such a quest. Although
many resources are available in print and online, there are few
individuals who possess the initiative for such self-study. Lastly,
whereas most Americans up through the mid-twentieth century
perceived Catholicism as only an oddity, today it is regarded as
181
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positively wicked by many academics. Both woke radicals and
liberal progressives regard orthodox Christianity with disdain, as
something to be spurned and shunned, its adherents
“cancelled.”183 This public hostility to Catholicism hinders both
interest in and mastery of the tradition.
Intertwined with this problem is the lack of mission-driven
Catholic law schools.184 In the manuscript we describe faculty
hiring since the early-1970s as either not taking account of
Catholic identity or taking it into account in a negative way. The
result is that today few law schools operating under Catholic
auspices treat mission as a hiring-positive.185 And, as Professor
Collett recounts, Catholic law faculty have a plausible reason to
avoid being perceived by their peers as authentically Catholic
because of the threat posed by adverse reputational
consequences.186
As things stand now, Catholic law students and lawyers who
aspire to teach law typically avoid identifying themselves as
Catholic to avoid giving faculty at existing schools a reason to
reject their candidacy. It is unclear how many other law
students and lawyers never even try to become law professors
because of the handicaps and barriers they suffer in the hiring
process. One indication that the hiring process currently filters
out and disincentivizes Catholic faculty is the research by
Professor James Lindgren, who has shown that Catholics are
significantly underrepresented in the law professoriate.187
Professor Collett argues that the problem caused by the lack
of mission-fit faculty is exacerbated by the presence of mission-
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hostile faculty on Catholic law faculties.188
She uses
Georgetown’s faculty as an example and identifies a number of
public advocates for non-Catholic positions on life and
marriage.189 As Collett acknowledges, it is hard to generalize to
the average Catholic law school,190 and this lack of information
makes it difficult to predict with confidence the receptivity of
existing faculty to mission-faculty hires. However, insofar as the
survey data summarized by Professor Collett from Professor
Lindgren is accurate and applies to Catholic law school
faculties,191 it suggests that the problem is acute. Our first-hand
and anecdotal knowledge of Catholic law school faculties fits this
evidence. That being said, there are numerous—we would
conjecture dozens of—current law professors who would be
mission-fit faculty at a Catholic law school. That would be
sufficient to provide a critical mass at a handful of the existing
schools, but not much more.
The willingness of law schools to be overt and unapologetic
in their Catholic identity and thereby provide a market for
mission-fit lawyers to become law professors would increase this
modest supply. Openly authentic Catholic law schools would
incentivize law students and lawyers to opt into law teaching and
identify themselves as mission-fit.
Analogous to the lack of mission-fit faculty is the lack of
mission-fit students. As Professor Pojanowski summarizes, “[a]ll
this and more applies to many students at Catholic law schools,
who may be no better catechized or no more receptive to the
Catholic intellectual tradition than the faculty and
administration at would-be reforming schools.”192
As we argued above, authentic Catholic legal education
should take a variety of manifestations, some of which will be
similar to existing law schools in many ways. Even the most
robust implementation of the tradition will not alter the “given”
aspects of American law, legal practice, and legal education.
This means that, from most students’ perspectives, there will be
little to repel them, and from some students’ perspectives, there
188

Collett, supra note 144, at 34–36; see also Pojanowski, supra note 177, at 76.
Collett, supra note 144, at 34–36.
190
Id. at 37–39. Professor Collett attempted to survey faculty scholarship, from
which she gleaned some additional valuable information, but the data set was too
sparse to support robust conclusions. Id. at 39–42.
191
Professor Lindgren’s study included Catholic law school faculty but his
findings did not parse out those faculties. Id. at 37–39.
192
Pojanowski, supra note 177, at 76.
189

2020]

A LIGHT UNSEEN: A RESPONSE

41

will be aspects that attract them. This conclusion is especially
true if most law students are looking for the best overall law
school “package” that will advance their career goals. There is no
reason to think that students would be put off by most
implementations of the tradition, so long as the schools provide
an effective pathway to the legal profession.
In the end, our current view is that there are sufficient
markets of faculty and students to demand a small number (in
the low-single digits) of authentically Catholic law schools. Dean
Boozang shares this perspective because she believes that there
is likely a market for “a handful” of mission-fit law schools.193
Of the two market challenges—inadequate faculty and
insufficient numbers of students—we believe the former is more
pressing and harder to remedy. Our argument is that Catholic
legal education is at its core an intellectual enterprise
characterized by engagement with the Catholic intellectual
tradition. Professors are the axial component because they carry
on the intellectual life of the school in their teaching, scholarship,
and mentoring. Without a mission-oriented faculty, the tradition
will have almost no impact on legal education.194
At the same time, a dearth of mission-fit faculty is very
difficult to remedy in the short and medium terms. Persons with
the inclination, skill, and knowledge to master one or more
subjects of American law, become adept at legal scholarship, and
to cultivate a working knowledge of the Catholic intellectual
tradition and employ it in their work, is a tall order in the best of
times. And these are not the best of times for the Church,
families, and educational institutions that have the capacity to
form such people.
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR
PROPOSAL
Many of the symposium participants agreed with our basic
thesis that Catholic legal education has a “need for more explicit
curricular and scholarly integration of the Catholic intellectual
tradition.”195 These contributions highlighted in greater detail
193
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the practical means whereby this basic thesis might be
implemented. We deeply appreciate these helpful, practical
proposals, both as evidence of what has and hasn’t worked in our
manuscript and as catalysts for us to bring our proposal into
sharper resolution.
A.

Teaching Jurisprudence and Meeting Students Where They
Are

Professor Uelmen insists that Catholic legal education today
must meet students where they are. As she sees it, “the most
urgent task for Catholic law schools is to help students reflect on
the question of how to make the connection between the difficult
cultural social, and institutional questions that they will face as
attorneys, in the light of critical reflection on their own deep
values systems.”196 Her remarks build off a quotation in the
manuscript from Rev. Robert J. Henle, S.J., then Georgetown’s
president, who in 1971 observed that students no longer come to
college grounded in the faith such that the task of Catholic
colleges and universities is “to reestablish the faith, to
reestablish their belief, to help young people find and internalize
a sound system of values for themselves.”197 This has much in
common with the themes of personal “encounter” and
“accompaniment” that have echoed throughout Pope Francis’s
pontificate.198
Dean Boozang helpfully explains that Catholic law schools
can meet students where they are by engaging them with the
tradition both directly and indirectly.199 She encourages Catholic
law faculty to teach “through the prism of the Catholic
intellectual tradition without naming it Catholic in the
classroom.”200 Boozang is correct that not all engagement with
the tradition need be overt. Some classes and faculty members
may explicitly engage the tradition, while other classes and
faculty may introduce students to aspects of the tradition in an
indirect manner.
For example, drawing upon a body of
ecclesiastical documents that frequently cite to the Bible and the
writings of the saints, a class on Catholic Social Thought would
196
197
198
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naturally be explicit in its engagement. By contrast a first-year
course in Contracts may only implicitly engage the tradition.201
Furthermore, following Dean Boozang’s advice, the way in which
a law school may engage the tradition may depend on the
composition of its student body. At the same time, a Catholic law
school that meets its students where they are should not use the
excuse of a diverse student body to render the tradition so
nondescript and indirect that the faculty and students do not
actually engage with it.202
Professor Pojanowski explains that his teaching of
Jurisprudence has been influenced by his encounter with
different kinds of students and his efforts to meet them where
they are. In his contribution to the symposium Pojanowski
describes how he arrived at his admittedly indirect approach to
teaching this required course at Notre Dame. Although Notre
Dame has many students who are attracted to the school
specifically because of its Catholic mission, some students resent
having to take the course.203 He sees his Jurisprudence students
as falling into three general categories: those who are firmly
committed to the tradition; those who are open to what the
course has to offer; and those students who see the course as a
waste of time having no practical value.204 Professor Pojanowski
experimented with different versions of the course hoping to
reach students in the latter two categories.205 He is aware that
“[w]ith nonjudgmentalism, casual emotivism, and ‘you do you’
ensconced as leading doctrines of our day, invoking a universal
moral order or objective truth about human flourishing is
decidedly countercultural” and unlikely to persuade.206
Ultimately he arrived at a structure that indirectly seeks to
convey to students the course’s thesis “without bullying or
propagandizing”: that the natural law tradition provides the
most accurate and attractive way of thinking about our legal
201
See JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 3 (1991) (showing that “present-day contract doctrine” is a product of a
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system and practice.207 This indirect presentation is achieved
through posing a question: “Do we believe there is, in fact, a
moral reality out there framing our deliberation about first-order
questions of justice and second-order questions about who ought
to answer them and how?”208 This course structure is realistic
and effective, working to meet the needs of all of Professor
Pojanowski’s students, while introducing them to the natural law
tradition.209
B.

Anthropology and Teaching Students the Layers of Law

The human person stands at the center of any plausible
theory of law. After all, the human person is the author, the
subject, the interpreter, and the enforcer of the laws that govern
human society. A number of other views of human nature—
grounded in materialism,210 mind-body dualism,211 expressive
individualism,212 hedonism, and moral relativism—are pervasive
in Western culture and dominant in American legal education.
Thus, one of the central claims we make in the manuscript is
that, to fulfill the common mission they all share, Catholic law
schools must introduce students to a Catholic anthropology.
Professor Garnett agrees that “the foundation and
cornerstone of [Catholic law schools’ intellectual] architecture
needs to be a distinctively Christian moral ‘anthropology.’ ”213 In
his contribution, Professor Garnett lays out, in preliminary
fashion, how a Catholic anthropology would be present
throughout the teaching of law at the law school.214 Garnett
describes how the study of law involves four layers of
comprehension. The first layer includes the posited data of law,
such as statutes and cases and gaining a familiarity with the
language of law—the jargon that lawyers regularly employ in
conducting their craft. The second layer involves a knowledge of
legal doctrine and the tools of legal analysis for understanding
207
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posited legal materials (such as cases and statutes), as well as
non-posited materials (such as judge-formulated tests) that
inhabit the legal system. The third layer is the stage of fit and
justification, where students learn to identify a given law’s point
and purpose, and engage in normative and logical critique. The
fourth and final layer is where students make “the connection
between our human nature and the legal enterprise,” where the
fact of our nature makes law’s import known.215
There is a tremendous amount packed into Professor
Garnett’s four-layered approach, and we cannot do justice to all
of its implications in this response. Here, however, we briefly
note four important implications. First, these four levels operate
(simultaneously) in all major facets of legal education: teaching,
student character formation, and faculty scholarship.
For
instance, a classroom teacher, when pedagogically appropriate,
should address not just the subject’s key posited law, or its unposited techniques, or the possible justifications for that
particular body of law. An excellent teacher in a Catholic law
school will also raise and engage the question of whether and
how law’s point is tied to who we are as human persons living in
community.
Second, the various levels Garnett identifies are reflexive so
that change at one level puts pressure on the other levels to fit
the change. For instance, a change in the meaning of “life” or
“person” in the text of the Constitution at level one will put
pressure on level four and vice versa.216
Third, Professor Garnett’s structure fits well with our focal
case analysis of Catholic legal education.217 Many Catholic law
schools do an excellent job at levels one and two, and some
appear to touch on level three—from both Catholic and nonCatholic perspectives. To the extent, however, that the fourth
level is not engaged or is not engaged with resources from the
tradition, as appears to be the case for most Catholic law
schools—to that extent, a Catholic law school will have fallen
short of its mission.
Fourth, the foundational level of Professor Garnett’s
analysis, the fourth layer of Catholic anthropology, includes
215
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aspects that are properly natural and supernatural, and this
latter aspect is not present in the current manuscript and
requires additional consideration. Following Alasdair MacIntyre,
Professor Garnett describes the key characteristics of the human
person as being dependent, relational, and rational.218 This
claim, while central to the tradition, is not uniquely Catholic, or
even religious. It is a claim that is open to natural inspection.
As such, law students of every background should be open to
serious consideration of this theory of human nature.
However, Professor Garnett also adds a fourth characteristic:
“loved.”219 Following Nicholas Wolterstorff, Garnett believes that
what makes human dignity a fact “is that we are loved by
God.”220 It is this aspect of our humanity that “provides a strong
account, not only of the what, but also of the why, of dignity, of
rights, and of justice—of the point of law.”221 For Garnett “[i]t is
not our capacities and abilities but our being-loved” that is the
source of human dignity.222
We agree, of course, that being loved by God is an essential
characteristic of being human. Indeed, “man would not exist
were he not created by God[’]s love and constantly preserved by
it,”223 and we appreciate the Church’s warning that “[w]hen God
is forgotten . . . the creature itself grows unintelligible.”224
Moreover, we acknowledge that justice secured under the rule of
law is not sufficient for a harmonious society, that something
more is needed—solidarity, friendship, love—“in order to keep
the world going.”225
Still, we believe that the emphasis in Catholic legal
education should remain on the other dimensions of a Catholic
anthropology. The nature of human beings as rational animals
gives the dignity of the human person a sound philosophical
explanation that Catholic law schools should employ. John
Finnis nicely summarizes this position: “the essence and powers
of the soul seem to be given to each individual complete (as
wholly undeveloped, radical capacities) at the outset of his or her
218
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existence as such. And this is the root of the dignity we all have
as human beings.”226 We believe this emphasis permits the legal
system and Catholic legal education to retain their proper
autonomy from theology. In particular, it maintains our claim
that our proposal that Catholic legal education is and should be
distinctive through its use of the Catholic intellectual tradition is
properly philosophical and jurisprudential in nature, and not
theological. Maintenance of this distinction fits well with the
tradition’s consideration of law and with American legal practice.
Furthermore, maintaining the philosophical character of our
proposal ensures that faculty at Catholic law schools need not
possess the theological virtues that only Christians may receive.
We offer this slightly expanded way of agreeing with
Professor Garnett’s incorporation of being loved into the Catholic
anthropology that undergirds Catholic legal education. God’s
providence of creation operates through many means. God’s love
is the cause of everything, including the existence of human
beings. God’s love is therefore the final cause of the life of every
human being and of humanity as a whole. At the same time, God
is also our formal cause. God continually loves us into being, and
he also formed each of us individually at a discrete moment in
time, in cooperation with our parents, through the rational soul
He gave to each of us. The nature of human beings as rational
animals gives the dignity of the human person a sound
philosophical explanation that Catholic law schools should
employ.
Professor Garnett’s summary of the key aspects of the
structure of law and legal education, and especially of Catholic
anthropology that forms the foundation for a distinctive Catholic
legal education, is attractive. We believe our incorporation of it
is accurate because it acknowledges the fact of human dignity
and it identifies a sound, widely accessible basis for that dignity.
Our anthropology maintains our proposal’s natural orientation so
it can fit within American legal practice, and it does not require
from faculty or students the theological virtue of faith.
C.

The History and Role of Clinics in Catholic Legal Education

Clinics, clinics, clinics! As we workshopped A Light Unseen,
presented it at symposia and conferences, and discussed it with
226
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friends and colleagues, we regularly heard a version of the
following claim: Catholic law schools today are Catholic in large
part because of their clinical offerings. Several contributors to
the St. John’s symposium offered the same argument. Dean
Vischer claims that the manuscript conveys “a rather dismissive
attitude toward Catholic law schools’ embrace of clinical legal
education as a case of bandwagon jumping.”227 Dean Boozang
repeatedly references Seton Hall’s clinics, the “Center for Social
Justice,” as a key situs where students learn about “justice and
the common good.”228
The claim we make in the manuscript is that the historical
record provides little evidence that Catholic law schools
established clinics to fulfill their Catholic mission.229 Nor is there
evidence that more than a handful of clinics are operated
distinctly, using the tradition’s resources. Moreover, the subject
areas addressed in the clinics operated at Catholic law schools—
poverty and public assistance, child and family law, immigration,
criminal defense, and veterans’ benefits—while deserving of
attention, are the same as those at their secular counterparts.
With few exceptions, Catholic law school clinics do not serve
clients or causes that are counter-cultural in a Catholic sense.230
227
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There is, however, ample evidence that Catholic law schools
established clinics for the pedagogical benefits to their students
and as a response to market pressures, so it is not surprising
that they are operated like non-Catholic law school clinics. As we
argued above, having a clinic is good and valuable, and all
Catholic law schools should host them. They can help students
acquire invaluable skills essential to legal practice and learn
what it means to take on the heavy, personal responsibility of
representing a client.231 At the same time, we maintain that
hosting clinics alone is insufficient evidence of authentic Catholic
education.
CONCLUSION
American Catholic legal education has recently celebrated its
150th anniversary. From the small seeds planted in the Indiana
wilderness near South Bend to today’s numerous, respected, and
influential law schools that span the country—from Manhattan
to San Diego, from Washington state to Florida—a lot has
changed. But, on a fundamental level, one aspect has remained
the same: Catholic legal education needs an intellectual
architecture to live up to its promise and fulfill its mission to
bring the light of Christ to the legal profession. The Catholic law
school deans and faculty who commented on A Light Unseen have
provided valuable constructive criticism and commentary, and
the book will be significantly better for it.
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